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CONTRACTS SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During the 1994 survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided two notable
contract cases regarding the extent of governmental liability. In United World
Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n,' the Tenth Circuit per-
mitted a foreign state to evade liability for its nonperformance of contractual
obligations by invoking foreign sovereign immunity. On the domestic front,
however, the Tenth Circuit required U.S. government agencies to honor their
contractual obligations owed to private investors in RTC v. FSLIC,2 despite
the agencies' attempt to invoke the sovereign acts doctrine.
Part I examines the Tenth Circuit's application of foreign sovereign im-
munity to a contract dispute between a Denver corporation and the Republic
of Kazakhstan. Part II explains the events occurring in the United States' thrift
industry during the past decade which led to litigation against the Federal
Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and related agencies. The
Survey concludes by reviewing how the Tenth Circuit was able to hold those
federal agencies liable for their breach of contract.
I. INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. The Development of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States
Foreign sovereign immunity is an international law doctrine whereby
domestic courts relinquish their jurisdiction over a foreign state.3 Thus, grant-
ing immunity to foreign states is not constitutionally mandated; rather, it is a
"matter of grace and comity" exercised by the United States.4
In the early nineteenth century, in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,5
Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation for the absolute theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, which lower courts generally followed until 1952.6 At
that time, the U.S. State Department announced its adoption of the restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity in the "Tate Letter".7 This theory re-
1. 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
2. 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1994).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6606.
4. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
5. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
6. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486. The absolute theory grants a state complete immunity from
the adjudicatory jurisdiction of foreign states. See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity
Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 497 (1992).
7. Donoghue, supra note 6, at 497. Jack B. Tate, the Acting Legal Advisor to the De-
partment of State, wrote a letter to the Attorney General on May 19, 1952 explaining why the
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stricted immunity to cases involving the public acts of foreign governments
and denied it for suits stemming from the commercial acts of foreign govern-
ments.8
In 1976, Congress codified the American version of the restrictive theory
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the Act).9 The stated purpose for
such action was "to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit
against a foreign state ... in the courts of the United States."'" The Act pro-
vides the only basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign government in
American courts," and must be applied in every action against a foreign sov-
ereign. 2
A foreign state is presumed immune from the jurisdiction of American
courts unless the case falls under one of the exceptions provided for by the
Act. 3 The most significant of these is the commercial exception found at §
1605(a)(2).' 4 Under § 1605(a)(2), courts will exercise jurisdiction if the suit
is based upon: (1) an act committed outside of U.S. territory; (2) which is con-
nected to a foreign state's commercial activity elsewhere; and (3) causes a
direct effect within the United States. 5 In such cases, the critical determina-
tion is whether the activity constitutes commercial activity causing direct ef-
fects within the United States.
The Act defines "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
State Department would no longer grant foreign governments immunity in certain types of cases.
26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952). The change in policy was necessitated in part by the increasing
amount of commercial activity governments were conducting. The change was also necessary
because the restrictive theory, under which "the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with
regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis)," was gaining widespread acceptance outside of the Soviet bloc. Id. at 984-85.
8. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
9. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. For a
more detailed discussion of the reasons for codification, see id. at 6606-08; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
487-88. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604.
11. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
12. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493.
13. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1476 (1993). The exceptions are found at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2164 (1992). The Act states in
relevant part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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its purpose."'6 In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,7 the Supreme
Court recognized the vagueness of this definition and attempted to clarify it.
The Court concluded that when a foreign state acts as a private player rather
than as a market regulator, its actions are commercial for purposes of the
Act.'8 The central issue in Weltover focused on whether the foreign state's
actions were of the type a private party would perform while conducting trade
or commerce, and did not focus on the reasons behind such action. 9 The
Court also rejected the interpretation of "direct effect," followed by some
circuits, which required the effect to be both substantial and foreseeable.20
Instead, the Court defined a direct effect under the Act as one which follows
as an "immediate consequence" of the foreign state's activity.2'
Although the Supreme Court has attempted to provide guidelines for inter-
preting the commercial exception, the critical terms involved still remain ill-
defined. The effect is that a plaintiff attempting to file suit against a foreign
state is forced to accept the commercial label placed on the foreign state's
activity by a district court. A court's characterization of the foreign state's act,
therefore, determines whether the suit is barred by immunity. United World
Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n22 provides an example as to
how costly sovereign immunity can be for companies contracting with foreign
states.
B. Tenth Circuit Decision:
United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n"
The plaintiff, United World Trade, Inc. (UWT), was a Colorado corpora-
tion operating out of Denver, Colorado.2" One defendant, Mangyshlakneft Oil
Production Ass'n (MOP), was authorized to conduct oil production and expor-
tation on behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan,2" and another defendant,
Kazakhstan Commerce Foreign Economic Association (Kazcom), served as
MOP's agent for its transactions with UWT.26
In December of 1991, representatives from UWT, MOP and Kazcom
entered into a preliminary agreement in Moscow. Under the terms of the
agreement, UWT was required to locate potential oil buyers for the first quar-
ter of 1992. MOP agreed to negotiate with UWT for prospective buyers, sup-
ply 200,000 metric tons of oil during the first quarter if a qualified buyer was
found by UWT, and provide 800,000 metric tons of oil during the rest of
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
17. 112 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
18. Id. at 2166.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2168.
21. Id. (quoting Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991),
aff d, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992)).
22. 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
23. 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
24. Id. at 1234.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1234-35.
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1992.27 On January 23, 1992, UWT, MOP and Kazcom signed a contract for
the sale of crude oil in Moscow. The contract required MOP to supply
200,000 metric tons of oil to an Italian customer (ISAB), and required UWT
to pay MOP 97% of the price paid by ISAB.28 The contract terms specified
the method of payment: in U.S. dollars via irrevocable credit opened by a
"first class European/USA bank."'2 9
The oil was to be transported to ISAB in four tanker shipments. UWT
selected the London branch of the San Paolo Bank to issue a credit letter
covering payment to MOP and to send Kazakhstan notice of the letter prior to
each delivery. Once notified, MOP was to ship the oil to ISAB and, upon
delivery, send the shipping documents to the bank in London. The London
bank would then send payment to MOP's account with the Credit Commercial
de France bank in Paris.3"
The dispute between the parties arose when the bill of lading for the third
oil shipment was allegedly stolen from a Kazcom representative.3 This event
led to UWT's six-year indemnification of ISAB in order to secure its payment
from ISAB. UWT then claimed that the defendants refused to supply it with
more oil and instead sold directly to ISAB. As a result, UWT filed suit for
breach of the preliminary agreement.32 MOP and Kazcom claimed foreign
sovereign immunity and UWT countered that the defendants were subject to
the jurisdiction of American courts under the commercial exception to the
Act.33 The resultant issue therefore, was whether the defendants' actions qual-
ified as a direct effect under the Act.34
The district court declined to interpret Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc.3" as requiring only a slight effect in the United States.36 Rather, the
court held that an effect qualifies as direct only if it flows as an immediate
consequence of the foreign state's activity.37 Moreover, the court concluded
that a financial loss alone incurred by a plaintiff in the United States is in-
sufficient to satisfy the direct effect requirement.3" After finding that both the




31. United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. 1405, 1407
(D. Colo. 1993), affd, 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1408.
34. For a discussion of previous judicial interpretations of the meaning of "direct effect," see
supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
35. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
36. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1408. Note that in doing so, the district court re-
fused to follow the rationale of Ampac Group Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973
(S.D. Fla. 1992), aff d, 40 F.3d 389 (11th Cir. 1994). Ampac involved a breach of contract claim
by a Florida corporation against the government of Honduras for a dispute arising from the sale of
a cement business as part of the government's privatization plan. Id. at 975-76. In holding that the
nature of the transaction qualified for the commercial exception, the court stated, "Weltover there-
fore teaches that the effect in the United States need only be slight." Id. at 977.
37. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1408.
38. Id. at 1409 (citing Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 891 (1989)).
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preliminary agreement and the sales contract had virtually no connection with
the United States, the court held that the losses suffered by UWT were not
legally significant39 and did not constitute a direct effect in the United
States.' It consequently granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.4
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of immunity. 2 The court itself rec-
ognized the direct effect clause as "hopelessly ambiguous when applied to any
particular transaction." 3 In reaching its decision, therefore, the court attempt-
ed to apply the Weltover guidelines to the particularities of the specific case
before it." It noted that UWT's case differed significantly from the situation
in Weltover because no part of MOP's performance occurred in the United
States: the oil was transferred from Kazakhstan to Italy. While performing
their contractual obligations, the defendants had absolutely no connection with
the United States.45 UWT's place of performance for its contract obligation
was specified as Paris.' The court, therefore, concluded that converting funds
into American dollars was not a direct effect following as an immediate conse-
quence from the defendants' acts.47
Likewise, the court found that Kazcom's failure to provide a bill of lading
for the third shipment did not have a direct effect within the United States.4
UWT's loss caused by indemnifying ISAB stemmed from its contractual obli-
gations with ISAB and not from those it had with MOP and Kazcom. Thus,
the contract with ISAB functioned as an intervening factor which prevented
the indemnification from being an immediate consequence of the defendants'
acts.49
39. Id. at 1408 (citing Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). The "legally significant" standard seems to require that the losses arise from acts that
created legal obligations or invoked the sanction of the law. The Zedan court listed a bank's refus-
al to pay on a letter of credit, a transfer of money, and incurring a debt, as legally significant
events. Zedan, 849 F.2d at 1515. But see Antares Aircraft, Ltd. Partnership v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that drawing a check on an American bank was
not a legally significant act), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
40. United World Trade, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 1409.
41. Id. at 1410.
42. United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).




47. Id. at 1238. "The requirement that an effect be 'direct' indicates that Congress did not
intend to provide jurisdiction whenever the ripples caused by an overseas transaction manage
eventually to reach the shores of the United States. Such is the case here." Id. House Report No.
1487 explains the meaning of "commercial activity":
This definition includes cases based on commercial transactions performed in whole or
in part in the United States, import-export transactions involving sales to, or purchases
from, concerns in the United States, business torts occurring in the United States ...
and an indebtedness incurred by a foreign state which negotiates or executes a public
lending institution located in the United States .... It will be for the courts to determine
whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in whole or in part in the
United States. This definition, however, is intended to reflect a degree of contact beyond
that occasioned simply by U.S. citizenship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 17-18, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615-16.
48. United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1238.
49. Id.
19951
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The Tenth Circuit concluded its opinion by holding that UWT's claim of
lost profits was not covered by the commercial exception because such losses
did not occur in the United States.50 The acts giving rise to the suit occurred
entirely in Europe: the contract was signed in Moscow, the oil was shipped
from Kazakhstan to Italy, UWT was paid in London, and MOP received its
payment in Paris. After examining the particularities of the situation, the court
held that the defendants' acts, as well as the resultant direct effects, occurred
in Europe rather than the United States.5 The effect of UWT transferring its
proceeds from London to the United States was insufficient for invoking the
commercial exception. To rule otherwise would be to interpret the commercial
exception in such a way as to grant district courts jurisdiction over any suit
arising out of an overseas transaction in which an American claims losses that
resulted from the acts of foreign states.52
C. Analysis
In United World Trade, the Tenth Circuit sought to impose parameters on
foreign governments' amenability to suit in American courts. In upholding the
defendants' claim of sovereign immunity, the Tenth Circuit followed other
circuits' interpretation of the scope of the commercial exception.53 American
companies should take notice. A corporation cannot satisfy the direct effects
requirement for jurisdiction against a foreign state simply by showing it is
incorporated under U.S. law and has its principal place of business within the
United States. Furthermore, those companies functioning as middlemen for
international transactions with no contractual performance obligations in the
U.S. should be particularly cautious. Under United World Trade, requiring
payment in American dollars and transferring those funds to the U.S. after
their initial deposit in a foreign bank will not allow a plaintiff to defeat the
presumption of immunity granted to foreign states. Such acts simply do not
rise to the level of direct effects.
This is a fair and reasonable decision. If a sophisticated business chooses
to deal outside of the United States in search of new business opportunities, it
should be prepared to bear the risks of operating within different legal re-
gimes. United World Trade went to Kazakhstan searching for new opportuni-
ties. Such opportunities do not come without risks. United World Trade could
50. Id. at 1238-39.
51. Id. at 1239.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(upholding sovereign immunity because of the absence of direct effects in the United States), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 728 (1995); Antares Aircraft, Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33,
36 (2d. Cir. 1993) (finding no direct effects when there is "no connection with the United States
other than the citizenship or place of incorporation of the plaintiff'), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878
(1994); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that "mere financial
loss suffered by a plaintiff in the United States as a result of the action abroad of a foreign state"
is an insufficient basis by itself for subject matter jurisdiction against a foreign state), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 891 (1989); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(finding no direct effects in the United States from financial hardships incidental to a contract
formed in Saudi Arabia).
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not expect the benefits of recourse in United States courts after it chose to do
business elsewhere. To hold otherwise would allow corporations the benefits
of overseas ventures, while insulating them from the consequences of such
ventures. American courts are not a residual insurance policy for American
corporations seeking overseas opportunities. Such corporations should not look
to American courts to minimize their risks when they have made deliberate
choices to do business elsewhere. 4
United World Trade exemplifies a situation in which a plaintiff may not
sue a foreign sovereign under the commercial exception. What United World
Trade does not demonstrate, however, is what type of contract with a foreign
state would satisfy the minimum threshold required to meet the direct effect
clause. Apparently, without some product or service crossing a U.S. border, or
at least one party utilizing a U.S. bank, there is no direct effect within the
United States for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The
peculiar irony is that foreign parties with sufficient savvy to contract with
foreign states for payment or partial performance within U.S. territory will
likely obtain recourse from U.S. courts in cases of breach. On the other hand,
American companies that contract with foreign states outside of U.S. territory
and transfer the proceeds home, will have no recourse from the U.S. judicial
system.55
II. THE FSLIC, FIRREA & THE DENIAL OF THE SOVEREIGN ACTS DEFENSE
A. Brief History of the Modern Thrift Industry
With its 1,700 failed thrift organizations, the Great Depression prompted
the congressional reform that provided the structure of the nation's savings
and loan industry for roughly fifty years.56 To regulate the thrift industry and
provide a deposit insurance fund, Congress created the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board ("Bank Board") and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC).57 These agencies were responsible for promulgating
regulations governing all federal savings and loan associations, including those
setting minimum capital requirements.
The 1980s, however, proved to be a devastating decade for the nation's
savings and loan industry. High interest rates and deregulation were a fatal
54. See Tubular Inspectors, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 977 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1992)
(granting sovereign immunity and noting that doing so prevents a company from "jurisdictionally
having its cake and eating it").
55. Compare the result in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992)
(denying immunity to Argentine government when sued by two Panamanian corporations and a
Swiss bank in U.S. federal court) with that in United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil
Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.2d 1232 (1994) (granting immunity to Kazakhstan government when sued by an
American corporation in U.S. federal court), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
56. H.R. REP. No. 54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
86, 88.
57. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 800 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and withdrawn,
(August 18, 1993); see also Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725
(1932); Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933); National Hous-
ing Act, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
58. Winstar, 994 F.2d at 800-01.
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combination for many thrifts.59 As an incentive to induce profitable financial
institutions to acquire the failing thrifts, the Bank Board and FSLIC allowed
them to deviate from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in
order to satisfy capital requirements.' The Bank Board thereby encouraged
acquisitions that would have otherwise failed due to regulatory capital require-
ments. The Bank Board's purpose was to prevent the closure of all the insol-
vent thrifts that the FSLIC's resources could not cover.6' The use of super-
visory goodwill and regulatory accounting practice (RAP) goodwill comprised
two of the major deviations from GAAP.6'
This practice continued until Congress enacted the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).63 The "precari-
ous financial condition" of the thrift industry, the "waning" consumer confi-
dence in it, and the "bankruptcy of FSLIC" necessitated the legislation.'M
FIRREA abolished both the FSLIC and the Bank Board.65 The FSLIC's in-
surance function was assigned to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Bank Board's regulatory function was transferred to the new-
ly created Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 6 Additionally, the previous
accounting standards allowed by the Bank Board were denounced as "regula-
tory and statutory accounting gimmicks."'67
FIRREA phased out the use of supervisory goodwill and stiffened capital
requirements. It required OTS to implement "uniformly applicable capital
standards for savings associations," including a leverage limit that maintained
core capital at not less than three percent of the savings association's total
assets, a tangible capital requirement of not less than 1.5 percent of total as-
sets, and a risk-based capital requirement.'
Consequently, FIRREA's stricter capital requirements thrust some of the
thrifts acquired by private investors prior to its enactment into noncompliance
with the new federal regulations. Litigation arose across the country as the
OTS informed reorganized thrifts and their investors that they were now insol-
vent. Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Albuquerque was one
such thrift caught in FIRREA's web after signing a deal with the FSLIC.'
59. H.R. REP. No. 54(l), supra note 56, at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 90.
60. Winstar, 994 F.2d at 801-02.
61. Id. at 801.
62. Id. at 801-802. Supervisory goodwill allows any excess in an acquisition's cost beyond
the fair market value of the acquired assets to be separately recorded as goodwill: capital deficits
are thus treated as an asset. RAP goodwill resulted when the FSLIC provided cash aid to the
acquiror. Rather than treating the cash amount as an asset which would have increased net worth
and decreased the amount of goodwill, the cash assistance was recorded as a credit to the net
worth without reducing the goodwill. Hence, the monetary contribution was counted twice: once
as tangible capital and once as RAP goodwill capital. Id. at 802.
63. Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
64. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 56, at 302, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98. As of
December 31, 1988, the FSLIC was $56 billion in the red, $37 billion of which stemmed from
1988 alone. Id. at 100.
65. See FIRREA, supra note 63.
66. Winstar, 994 F.2d at 804.
67. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 56, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 94.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1)(A), (t)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1993).
69. Security Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 796 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (D.N.M. 1991),
[Vol. 72:3
CONTRACTS
B. Tenth Circuit Decision: RTC v. FSLIC
70
After the failing Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Albu-
querque (Old Security) fell under federal regulatory control, FSLIC determined
that it would be more cost-effective to solicit new capital sources rather than
to liquidate Old Security.7" Plaintiffs, First Southwest Financial Services,
Clarence Ashcraft, and Allen White (the Investors), invested in and formed
Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Albuquerque (New Securi-
ty) in 1985 by merging with Old Security. Although the Investors contributed
$6 million in cash to New Security, the amount was insufficient to bring the
merged institutions into solvency. As part of an Assistance Agreement with
the Investors, FSLIC agreed to include a $7 million debenture as regulatory
capital and $12 million as supervisory goodwill to be amortized over a period
of thirty-five years.72 New Security then proceeded to operate profitably un-
der the terms of the Assistance Agreement.
After the passage of FIRREA, however, OTS notified Security Federal of
its tangible insolvency and imposed lending restrictions on it. The Investors
tendered ownership of Security Federal via letter back to the OTS and request-
ed restitution which OTS refused.73 Plaintiffs then filed suit claiming, among
other things, breach of contract and frustration of purpose.74 OTS placed Se-
curity Federal into receivership with the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
shortly thereafter.75
The district court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact
regarding the documents and events of the case. 6 Within the three documents
forming the contract 77 between the Investors and the defendants, the court
found that "treatment of goodwill as regulatory capital [was] an express term
of the overall contractual agreement. '78 It held that the defendants had also
explicitly waived the application of contrary regulation disallowing the use of
goodwill as regulatory capital by not expressly or implicitly reserving any
statutory rights to do SO° 71 The court noted that the treatment of goodwill was
fundamental to the contract, since "the merger would have made no sense
without this special treatment of goodwill, as the new institution would have
been insolvent at its inception and no rational investor would have participated
under those conditions."80
affd sub nom. RTC v. FSLIC, 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1994).
70. 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1994).
71. Security Federal, 796 F. Supp. at 1437.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1438.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1438. FIRREA established Resolution Trust Corporation as the successor to FSLIC
as conservator or receiver to manage and resolve cases involving thrifts insured by FSLIC prior to
enactment of FIRREA. FIRREA, supra note 64, at 369-70.
76. Security Federal, 796 F. Supp. at 1442.
77. Three writings, the Assistance Agreement, the Resolution, and the Letter, formed the
contract between the Investors and the defendants. See id. at 1443-44.
78. Id. at 1444.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1445.
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As a last resort, the defendants attempted to bar any liability by invoking
the sovereign acts doctrine. The district court found that the doctrine's purpose
was to ensure that the government, when acting as a contractor, was treated as
any private contractor would be regarding contractual liability. Indeed, its
goal was not simply to immunize the government whenever it legislates for
the general welfare.8 The court held that the sovereign acts doctrine did not
bar the Investors' breach of contract claim, because the FSLIC specifically
promised the Investors the use of goodwill as regulatory capital for a 35-year
period, and, thereby, waived the application of contrary regulations. 2 The
district court found the defendants in breach of the contract and held them
liable just as it would any private contractor.83 The Investors were therefore
awarded rescission and restitution on their motion for summary judgment.84
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on appeal.85 The
court recognized that supervisory and regulatory goodwill played "crucial"
roles in the acquisition of Old Security, and that without them, New Security's
capitalization would have been $6.5 million short of the regulatory compliance
amount. 6 The defendants asserted that the Assistance Agreement, exclusive
of the Resolution and the Letter, formed the contract and did not concern su-
pervisory goodwill. 7 The court disagreed with the defendants' interpretation
of the contract. It found that the Assistance Agreement relied upon both the
Resolution and the Letter due to the three writings' contemporaneous issuance
for the purpose of acquisition and the explicit cross-references to the other
writings contained within each of them.8 Furthermore, the contractual lan-
guage clearly stated that the supervisory goodwill was to apply to continuing
regulations and not just the acquisition.89 The Tenth Circuit held that the lan-
guage of the contract was completely unambiguous: the government could
have easily restricted the supervisory goodwill to the transaction had it so
desired.'
The defendants also asserted that OTS's enforcement of FIRREA's capital
regulations could not constitute breach of contract due to the sovereign acts
doctrine.9 The court explained the doctrine as follows:
81. Id. at 1446. For further explanation regarding the doctrine's origins, evolution, and ap-
plication, see Ronald G. Morgan, Identifying Protected Government Acts Under the Sovereign Acts
Doctrine: A Question of Acts and Actors, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 223 (1993).
82. Security Federal, 796 F. Supp. at 1447.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. RTC v. FSLIC, 25 F.3d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1994).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1499.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1500. The Resolution stated, "for purposes of reporting to the Bank Board or the
FSLIC, the value of any intangible assets on the books of New Security resulting from accounting
for the Merger in accordance with the purchase method may be amortized by New Security over a
period not to exceed 35 years .... I "d. The Letter also stated that "for purposes of reporting the
value of any intangible assets resulting from accounting for the acquisition in accordance with the
purchase method, may be amortized by Security of Albuquerque over a period not to exceed 35
years .... "Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1501.
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The sovereign acts doctrine operates to insulate the government
from liability for certain inabilities to perform contractual obligations.
More specifically, when the government enacts legislation of general
applicability for the benefit of the general welfare and such legislation
inadvertently affects the government's performance of a contract to
which it is a party, the government cannot be held liable for damages
resulting from its failure to perform any more than it would if it were
an individual private party.
The bounds of the immunity afforded the government by the
sovereign acts doctrine, however, are not limitless. The limits of this
immunity are defined by the extent to which the government's failure
to perform is the result of legislation targeting a class of contracts to
which it is a party. If Congress enacts legislation targeted to abro-
gate preexisting contract obligations the government owes to private
citizens, the government may be properly sued for breach.92
In the case of congressional legislation involving agencies, discretion
becomes the crucial element. If Congress provides an agency with discretion
in the enforcement of a mandate because it is aware that an abrupt change in
law would abrogate prior agreements, the agency may be held in breach of
any agreement that the agency could have honored by exercising such discre-
tion.93 The court found that FIRREA's structure reflected Congress's aware-
ness of, and desire to mitigate, the paralyzing effects that the heightened capi-
tal requirements would have on mergers.94 FIRREA provided OTS with the
ability to allow for both the limited use of supervisory goodwill and the ex-
emption of thrifts from the revised capital standards.95 Because the Director
of the OTS had the discretion to allow for continued use of regulatory ac-
counting measures but opted instead to ignore the contract's goodwill terms,
the court found OTS to be in breach of contract.%
Furthermore, because no rational investor would have entered into the
contract without the special accounting arrangements, the court agreed that
they constituted material terms of the contract.97 "[W]ithout supervisory and
regulatory goodwill, New Security would have debuted as an insolvent institu-
tion."'98 The court held, therefore, that OTS's actions constituted breach of a
material term of the contract and discharged the plaintiffs from further perfor-
mance. 9 In addition to the breach of contract, the Tenth Circuit also found
frustration of purpose. It held that the application of FIRREA's capital require-
ments made it impossible for the Investors to fulfill their contractual obligation
92. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93. Id.





99. Id. at 1503.
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to operate the thrift in compliance with regulations." ° This completely frus-
trated the investors' purpose and warranted discharge of their agreement to ac-
quire the thrift."'
Finally, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling granting the
Investors $6 million and postjudgment interest as restitution.'0 2 The purpose
of rescission and restitution is to restore the plaintiff to the position he or she
enjoyed before entering into the contract by requiring the defendant to return
the value of plaintiff's consideration." 3 The measure of restitution falls with-
in the discretion of the trial court and depends on the circumstances of the
case." 4 Because the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court, the
amount of the award was upheld.
C. Analysis
The court's opinion is a refreshing dose of common sense. OTS must
wish that it would have exhibited just that when it considered how to handle
the application of FIRREA to Security Federal. Congress passed FIRREA in
an effort to lead the way out of the thrift industry fiasco of the last decade. Its
intent was to restructure the system in order to remedy the volatile situation
and limit losses. If anything, OTS's actions in RTC v. FSLIC would have
exacerbated the situation. The FSLIC elected to find capital investors for a
failing thrift because it was a cheaper solution than liquidation. After passage
of FIRREA, OTS attempted to renege on its end of the deal by denying the
special accounting promised to the investors. This would have returned New
Security to the insolvent state it was in 1985 and bilked the Investors of their
$6 million.
What Congress surely did not intend by enacting FIRREA was to abandon
any and all contracts that the FSLIC entered into with investors and declare
profitable, restructured thrifts insolvent. The Tenth Circuit recognized the folly
in this. To rule otherwise would establish a dangerous precedent of allowing
the government to breach its express obligations every time it changed its
mind. Because the Tenth Circuit wanted to send such a broad message, it
ruled that the government's breach was grounds for awarding rescission and
restitution. The court could have avoided the issue of breach, sidestepped the
government's sovereign acts defense, and still awarded the restitution sought
by the investors by rescinding the agreement on the grounds of frustration of
purpose. Instead, it chose to meet the government's sovereign acts defense
head-on, and effectively sent a broader message to federal agencies generally
to keep their promises whenever they have the discretion to do so. Perhaps in
the future OTS will pay more attention to the discretion granted to it and heed
the old adage: "if it ain't broke, don't fix it".
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1504-1507.
103. Id. at 1504 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 370 (1981)).





The 1994 survey period presented two unusual contract cases that required
the Tenth Circuit to apply federal law rather than state law via the Erie doc-
trine. Both of the scenarios presented by these cases are ripe for repeat occur-
rence in the future. International commerce will only expand as more players
opt to enter the global market, and thrift investors will continue to fight the
application of FIRREA's capital requirements. In United World Trade, the
Tenth Circuit realized the limits to its own power. The foreign state's connec-
tions to the U.S. were insufficient for asserting jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. In RTC v. FSLIC, however, the Tenth Circuit real-
ized the limits of the OTS's power and accordingly forced it to act as a pri-
vate player would under the law.
Lisa Zeiler Joiner"
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